GEOPOLITICA SPAIULUI PONTO - DANUBIAN

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

GeoPolitica Revist de Geografie Politic, Geopolitic i Geostrategie

Bucureti 2004www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

ASOCIAIA DE GEOPOLITIC ION CONEA

CONSILIUL TIINIFIC prof. univ. dr. Lucian CULDA prof. univ. dr. Nicholas DIMA prof. univ. dr. George ERDELI lect. univ. dr. Gheorghe ILIESCU dr. Cristian JURA

dr. George Cristian MAIOR prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe MARIN conf. univ. dr. Vasile MARIN prof. univ. dr. Silviu NEGU conf. univ. dr. Gheorghe NICOLAESCU dr. Ion PETRESCU

NOT Autorii sunt responsabili att de alegerea i prezentarea datelor coninute n articole, ct i de

opiniile exprimate, care nu sunt ntotdeauna identice cu cele ale Asociaiei de Geopolitic Ion Conea i nu angajeaz n nici un fel redacia revistei GeoPolitica.

Formulrile i prezentarea materialelor nu reprezint ntotdeauna poziia revistei GeoPolitica, n ceea ce privete statutul juridic al statelor, teritoriilor, localitilor sau autoritilor acestora i nici n privina delimitrii frontierelor i granielor.

Reproducerea integral sau parial a oricrui material scris sau ilustrativ din aceast publicaie este interzis n lipsa unui acord scris din partea editorului.

Redacia revistei nu-i asum responsabilitatea pentru coninutul materialelor prezentate de sponsori.

COLEGIUL DE REDACIE AL REVISTEI GeoPolitica

Director Vasile SIMILEANU

Redactor ef Cristina GEORGESCU

Secretar general de redacie Silviu COSTACHIE

Secretar de redacie Cristina IONESCU

Redactor coordonator: Silviu NEGU

Documentare: Ioan Mihail OPRIESU Dnu Radu SGEAT

Redactori: Roxana MANEA Adela MARTIN

Coperta i grafica Vasile SIMILEANU

Editura TOP FORM tel. / fax: 665.28.82; tel.: 0722.704.176, 0722.207.617;

Email: simi@fx.ro

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

Anul II, nr. 6 (2 / 2004)

SUMAR

EDITORIAL Ion PETRESCU

Formatul dezirabil ........................................................................ ....... 1 ............

EVENIMENT ........ George Cristian MAIOR

The New Allies and Emerging Security Dynamics in the Black Sea Area.................................................................. ....... 5

............

ESEU ........ Nicholas DIMA

The Black Sea Region: New Economic Cooperation and Old Geopolitics ..................................................................... ..... 11

............

REPORTAJ ........ Ctlin STRIBLEA

Provocarea NATO ........................................................................ ..... 26 ............

UNIVERSITAS ........ Roxana MANEA ........

Sub stindard NATO (jurnal de bord)............................................ ..... 29 ............

RESTITUIRI ........ Petre DEIC ........

Binomul geopolitic Romnia Marea Neagr ............................ ..... 34 ............

GEOPOLITIC ........ Constantin ONIOR, Mihail Vasile OZUNU ........

Poziia geostrategic a Romniei la Marea Neagr .................... ..... 37 Gheorghe NICOLAESCU ........

Marea Neagr ultima frontier NATO ....................................... ..... 41 Ctlin Marius TRNACOP ........

Marea Neagr i securizarea Drumului Mtsii, elemente principale pentru stabilitatea Europei n perspectiv................. ..... 49

Vasile SIMILEANU ........ Sistemul geopolitic ponto - danubian realiti i perspective. ..... 67

Vasile MARIN ........ Aspecte geopolitice ale compactului caucaziano - pontic......... ..... 86

Cosmin LOTREANU ........ Marea Neagr i jocul geopolitic ................................................. ..... 91

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

Gheorghe VDUVA ........ Sinaps strategic ....................................................................... ..... 94

Radu SGEAT ........ Strmtorile ponto - mediteraneene. Consideraii geopolitice .... ... 103

Mdlin Bogdan RPAN ........ Marea Neagr ntre provocare i oportunitate............................ ... 112

Mihail OPRIESCU ........ Marea Neagr i Asia Central. Reorientri geopolitice ntr-o lume unipolar............................. ... 117

............

GEOGRAFIE POLITIC ........ Teodor P. SIMION ........

Marea Neagr repere geopolitice.............................................. ... 125 Cristian JURA, Drago ZAHARIA ........

Geopolitic, minoriti i securitate la Marea Neagr ................ ... 133 Radu tefan VERGATTI ........

O problem de geopolitic pontic: Stpnirea i populaia Dobrogei n prima parte a secolului al XIX-lea (1812 1878) .... ... 139

Tahsin GEMIL ........ The Issues of Tatars Ethno-genesis........................................... ... 148

............

GEOSTRATEGIE ........ Gheorghe MARIN ........

Unele consideraii privind dimensiunea geostrategic ........ a Mrii Negre ................................................................................ ... 153

Eugen ZAINEA ........ Zona Mrii Negre, resurse, potenial, interese............................ ... 158

Marcela NEDEA ........ Portul Constana plac turnant a transporturilor europene ........ i euro - asiatice........................................................................... ... 167

Gheorghe MOLDOVEANU ........ The Port of Constana, a Sustainable Gateway to the World..... ... 175

Daniel BROASC ........ Ameninrile teroriste n lumea virtual...................................... ... 185

*** ........ Declaraia de la Tulcea - 07 mai 2004.......................................... ... 193

*** ........ Raportul Ramsar Advisory Mission 27-31 oct. 2003................ ... 196

............

SEMNAL EDITORIAL

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

7

FORMATUL DEZIRABIL

Ion PETRESCU

Provocarea urmtorului deceniu pentru zona Mrii Negre pare a fi promovarea valorilor euroatlantice ntr-un spaiu unde perceperea i interpretarea acestora - n cele ase state riverane i cele nvecinate - este diferit, poziiile oficiale mergnd de la subscrierea fr rezerve, pn la delimitarea n termeni mai degrab categorici, dect vehemeni. Concomitent, simpla trecere n revist a studiilor recente, de specialitate viznd securitatea rilor din regiunea menionat indic - fr rezerve - principalul actor, dar i catalizator al viitoarelor evoluii n aceast zon: Statele Unite. Se invoc, dar se i mizeaz pe determinarea Washingtonului de a contribui, de o manier adecvat, la depirea situaiei actuale. Una n care coordonarea regional este mai mult un deziderat, pentru care se pledeaz, cu argumente naionale diferite, uneori opuse, la reuniuni politice, tiinifice, regionale sau internaionale. Pragmatismul celor de peste Ocean poate da un coninut nou legturilor actuale, din bazinul Mrii Negre. Aa s-ar materializa viziunea american de transformare a acestui areal ntr-un liant solid, viabil pe termen lung, pentru regiunile geopolitice limitrofe Balcanii, Orientul Mijlociu i Asia Central, ex-sovietic.

De altfel, o evaluare a organizaiilor din care fac parte rile din aceast sensibil zon - amintim aici doar NATO i OSCE - indic omniprezena SUA. Care, totui, nu face parte din grupul, mai mult simbolic, GUUAM - alian declarat strategic de statele componente: Georgia, Ucraina, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidjan i Moldova. Chiar dac pericolele reaprinderii unor conflicte locale mai persist n pseudo-formaiuni statale, de mrime liliputan, precum Transnistria sau Cecenia, soluionarea pe termen lung a viitorului acestor artificiale enclave nu mai depinde doar de cei implicai direct n conflictele armate regionale. Asta pentru c pacificarea, impus militar sau diplomatic, fr eliminarea cauzelor care au dus la repetarea situaiilor de criz - traficul de arme, de droguri, de carne vie -, nu mai constituie un el viabil, dect dac este urmat de implementarea unor programe cu finanri solide, care s ofere sigurana zilei de mine tuturor comunitilor locale, artificial nvrjbite, pe criterii aparent naionale.

De altfel, concepia actualei administraii americane, de ncurajare a extinderii democraiei n Orientul Mijlociu, concomitent cu asigurarea stabilitii regionale n spaiile conexe, a influenat amplificarea eforturilor majoritii statelor limitrofe Mrii Negre de a deveni iniial parte a comunitii euroatlantice, apoi a celei europene. La Washington D.C. se consider - de exemplu c, la ora actual, noua conducere a Georgiei se poate baza pe sprijinul Romniei, Greciei i Bulgariei pentru a se apropia mai mult de Europa. n acelai timp, experii americani sper c Georgia va deveni stimulatorul cooperrii statelor caucaziene i a celor din Orientul Mijlociu cu cele din regiunea Mrii Negre.

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

8

Ode

ssa

Sev

asto

pol'

Sim

fero

pol'

Yal

ta

Bel

goro

d-

Dn

estr

ovsk

iy

Tira

spol

'

Ker

ch'

Nov

oros

siis

k

Tuap

se

Soc

i

Suk

hum

i

Po

ti K

utai

si

Bat

umi

Trab

zon

Car

sam

ba

Sam

sun

Elzig

Siv

as

Cor

um

Kirr

ikka

le

Sin

op

Kara

buk

Zon

guld

ak

Ere

gli

Eskis

ehir

Izm

it Is

tan

bu

l

Ban

dirm

a C

anak

kale

Teki

rdag

Kha

sko

vo

Plo

vdiv

Ya

mbo

l B

urga

s

Gab

rovo

V

elik

o T

urno

vo

Shu

men

Va

rna C

onst

ana

Bra

sov

Tulc

ea

Izm

ail

Bra

ila

Gal

ai

Suc

eava

Ank

ara

Chi

in

u

Buc

ure

ti

RU

SIA

GE

OR

GIA

TUR

CIA

BU

LGA

RIA

TUR

CIA

G

RE

CIA

Cri

mee

a

MO

LDO

VA

RO

MA

NIA

UK

RA

INE

Su

rs:

Va

sile

Sim

ilea

nu

, ,

Bu

cu

re

ti, 1

998

Geo

po

litic

a sp

aiu

lui c

arp

ato

-dan

ub

ian

o-p

onti

c

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

9

Concret, modalitile prin care Statele Unite acioneaz deja pentru ntrirea securitii din bazinul Mrii Negre sunt: investiiile de ordin economic; influena politic, mai mult sau mai puin vizibil n statele riverane; iniierea de aciuni asumate de structuri multinaionale precum Aliana Nord - Atlantic i, nu n ultimul rnd, prezena militar direct. Care, conform planului Pentagonului, prezentat recent de generalul Ralston se va ntri. Retragerea a dou divizii americane din Germania va fi urmat nu numai de posibile dislocri de trupe n regiuni instabile, ci i de instalarea unor baze, mai mici, cu trupe mobile, gata de aciune, n Romnia i Bulgaria.

Exerciiile navale organizate n Marea Neagr, precum Cooperative Partner i Sea Breeze s-au desfurat i cu participarea militarilor venii de peste Ocean. Concomitent, Aliana i-a amplificat prezena n cadrul acestei regiuni. n consecin, flancul sudic al NATO va fi i n continuare focalizat att pe necesara proiecie a forelor aliate n Balcani, Asia ex-sovietic i Orientul Mijlociu, ct i pe contracararea, dac va fi cazul, a unor conduite agresive la nord i est de Marea Neagr. Cu precizarea c acum, dei aceasta este o simpl situaie ipotetic, nu este omis de experii aliai cel mai ru scenariu pentru care militarii, n mod firesc, trebuie s fie instruii.

Cercettori din rile regiunii Mrii Negre urmresc lurile de poziie din capitala american, cu dorina de a deslui opiunea final privind aceast zon-pivot pentru interesele strategice ale Statelor Unite pe trei continente. Sintagmele folosite reflect mai degrab variante valabile n ultimele patru decenii ale veacului trecut. Astfel, balana puterilor amintete mai degrab perioada rzboiului rece. Iar securitatea colectiv ne duce cu gndul la Europa fascinat de OSCE. n schimb se recunoate, tacit sau explicit, rolul special pe care America l poate juca pentru stabilizarea unei zone cu mari discrepane ntre nivelurile de dezvoltare economic, cu populaii mpinse, nolens-volens, de srcie, la ascunderea sau sprijinirea tacit a elementelor teroriste.

Pilonii formatului dezirabil la Washington D.C. pentru o consolidare a securitii regionale n zona Mrii Negre nu sunt puini. Relaiile bilaterale ale SUA cu Rusia i Ucraina sunt dominate, la ora actual, de normalitate raporturilor ntre parteneri contieni de fora comun, ca factor disuasiv al unor poteniale atacuri teroriste. Aliailor naturali, Romnia, Turcia i Bulgaria state membre NATO li se adaug, n forme de cooperare adecvate i Georgia, ar care, mpreun cu Armenia i Azerbaidjan beneficiaz de prezena, la o baz militar georgian, a instructorilor trimii de Pentagon. Acetia au misiunea de a-i nva pe genitii din cele trei state tehnici moderne de deminare. O prioritate generat de existena nenumratelor cmpuri de mine n aceast zon, cumplit afectat de conflictele militare din ultimii 15 ani. Relaia special a Federaiei Ruse cu NATO, ca i legtura stabilit ntre Aliana Nord - Atlantic i Ucraina vizeaz, pe termen lung: schimbul reciproc de informaii, ndeosebi cele necesare campaniei antiteroriste; interoperabilitatea forelor militare ruseti i ucrainene cu cele ale comunitii euroatlantice; configurarea, structurarea, poziionarea i desfurarea unei viitoare fore de reacie rapid.

Cum standardele de referin, cel puin n plan militar, vor fi aa cum se accept inclusiv la Moscova i Kiev cele ale Organizaiei Tratatului Nord - Atlantic, reiterm teza iniial. Provocarea urmtorului deceniu, pentru zona Mrii Negre va fi promovarea valorilor euroatlantice. Nu impunerea lor.

Apariia unei noi generaii de lideri politici, convini de avantajele trecerii la economia de pia i la un regim politic bazat pe pluralism i alegeri libere a fost

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

10

anticipat de schimbarea la fa a Georgiei. Considerat i nceputul conectrii Estului zonei Mrii Negre la Europa. Georgia este prima pies din irul celor supuse principiului dominoului. Ca start al ieirii la lumina libertii a naiunilor supuse nc unor regimuri autoritare i unor hegemonii motenite din secolul trecut.

Traseul viitoarelor conducte petroliere variantele concurente viznd trecerea pe teritoriile Turciei, Ucrainei, Romniei sau Bulgariei va determina creterea interesului SUA pentru stabilitatea regiunii adiacente Mrii Negre.

Formatul dezirabil - att pentru Washington D.C. ct i pentru rile acestei zone - va fi unul n care nimeni nu va fi exclus de la accelerarea, pe baze noi, a dezvoltrii cooperrii politice, economice i militare regionale. Practic - prin valorile nsuite sau acceptate, fie i parial, de statele aspirante i cele partenere -, comunitatea euroatlantic va contribui la remodelarea zonei fr stabilitatea creia porile caucaziene vor fi nchise, cile de acces n Orientul Mijlociu vor fi blocate, iar zbuciumatul spaiu balcanic ar fi lipsit de conexiuni economice vitale.

Marinarii de curs lung susin c, fiind de dimensiuni mici i relativ nchis, Marea Neagr este cea mai capricioas, o furtun putnd fi declanat oricnd, din senin. Privind napoi, inclusiv istoria ultimilor ani, nu putem dect s recunoatem c destule conflicte militare s-au declanat, n aceast zon, pe neateptate. Mcinnd, ulterior, energiile unor naiuni care sunt hrzite s triasc mpreun. Fora economic, politic i militar a Americii poate dinamiza apropierea dintre statele regiunii Mrii Negre. Iniial SUA, apoi NATO pot deveni garantul stabilitii acestui areal prea mult disputat anterior. Cu consecine cunoscute.

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

11

THE NEW ALLIES AND EMERGING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

George Cristian MAIOR

My presentation will focus on the both the durable trends in this area, as well as on the recent important changes in the strategic paradigms after the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11.

So, why the Black Sea area? There are three main guiding reasons for my assessment. First, because I believe this region has gained an unprecedented strategic weight in recent years with respect to both the international campaign against the terrorism and the enlargement of NATO and European Union. Second, because I think there are some historic analogies and lessons on this region that we should remember while advancing the international community goals of peace and stability. And third, and this will be one of the main focus of my remarks, because I believe that more recently, the Black Sea area encountered a significant change in its traditional security paradigm that will have a long term impact on the European and Eurasian security as a whole.

Such a rich subject could be divided into three parts: 1. First, what are the strategic assets and opportunities of the Black Sea area? 2. Second, what are the challenges and how the risks and threats emerging

from the Black Sea area affect the European security? 3. Third, what are the bases for building a new security approach to the future

of this region? 1. Strategic assets and opportunities Against this background of opportunities, challenges and policies, we should

examine very briefly some geographical coordinates with interesting influences on the security of this space.

The Black Sea region includes the coastal waters of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine and it is an area with densely populated shores of about 16 million inhabitants, significant natural resources and a tiny connection to the Mediterranean through the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles . Although it cannot be considered entirely an open sea, it is directly linked with important communication lines, through rivers (the Danube, Volga, Don) and land corridors that unite East-West the Central Europe to Caucasus and Central Asia, and from North to South, the Baltic area to South Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. These routes have been extensively used for both military campaigns and economic trade since the first Greek colonies were established along its shores. The only period when the Black Sea has been a frozen lake and the communication channels interrupted, has been the 50-year Cold War division, when the boundary between the two blocks was basically crossing the heart of this region.

Against this short descriptive background, my evaluations will address an extended vision about the Black Sea, since evolutions in this region are intrinsically connected to the security developments in the Balkans from Former Yugoslavia to Albania and Greece, Caucasus with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Near and Middle East, from Turkey to Iraq and Iran. To some extend we can also speak about direct connections to Central Asia along the lines of expansion of Alexandru Macedon and along the former famous Silk Road.

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

12

Its strategic importance along the centuries lied in the role it played as a bridge and a frontier, a buffer zone and a transit one, between Europe and Asia and at the crossroad between powers and empires. Moreover the Black Sea stood for a point of juncture between commercial routes and regions rich in energetic resources.

But what does it mean this dichotomy bridge versus frontier that shaped along the history most of strategies of great powers and empires and why is this relevant for the current assessment on Black Sea security? The Great Game in the Black Sea was and is shaped by two types of core-policies: political-military containment and deterrence, and economic linkage between continents.

The containment goes beyond contemporary history and the Cold War. Along with the southern part of the Danube, the Black Sea has been the limes (in Latin frontier) between Europe and the Asian continent, the place of confrontation with barbarian tribes and the strategic point from where expansions and invasions advanced either East (such as the crusades) or West (the Ottoman empire). In some cases expansion has also been the vehicle for prevention. The Roman emperor Traian asserted as main risk to its empire that incorporated todays Romania and Bulgaria the conquering expeditions of the Parts. Therefore he launched a campaign to fight the threat right where it came from, namely in the Middle East, and died on his way home after a successful war in the area of contemporary Tikrit.

The Black Sea region always stood for a strategic asset for employability and mobility of military forces in both deterrence and expansion policies. After the 90s, we face a conceptual disruption of this theme, since todays conflicts have been de-territorialized and the former inner value of the seas could be asserted in a different perspective.

Political containment has been transformed into the building of cooperative arrangements for the expansion of peace and security, instead of territorial expansion. Regional instruments have been created to build a common understanding among political elites and advance stability and cooperation beyond the European continent. The Partnership for Peace is currently encircling the Black Sea area into a framework of political interactions and common plans for security sector reform and modernization.

Also, military containment in classical terms became obsolete since the security risks and threats are no longer stemming from states, but rather from un-conventional phenomena generated by emerging non-state actors and sustained through rogue or failed states. The development of terrorism, armaments proliferation and organized criminality transferred the policies of containment to a different configuration of technologies and instruments. The ways to conduct war have gradually been de-territorialized with the development of missile and means of delivery that could reach distant lands in a matter of hours. In this new type of containment, the space of the Black Sea could stand for a part of the broader defensive arc based on surveillance and early warning, information sharing or defense against potential missile attacks. The participation of riparian countries as members or partners of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance in the Partnerships Action Plans against terrorism ensures a formal extensive basis of cooperation in this area.

Also the strategic positions that have been used in history for military campaign changed their importance and significance. The Cherson peninsula (currently Crimeea, on the neighboring Sea of Azov) that stood for the launching point of military operations from the Black Sea to South Eastern Europe and Mediterranean has exhausted its geographic opportunities in this respect. The control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits is now important not as the short route for crusaders to the Middle East, but in connection to the lines of communication and transit that link them to the Mediterranean and to the European continent. From Gibraltar to Bosphorus, former strategic locations rely more on the logic of new military arrangements for early warning and patrolling as defined for example by the Operation Active Endeavor launched by NATO in the Mediterranean after September 11 events than on the past motivations for the use of seas.

Going from containment to commerce, this region maintained a major role for the commercial flows from Asia to Europe and the continental transportation routes North-South that connect the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Since very old times, the famous

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

13

ancient Silk Road from Asia to Caucasus and South Eastern Europe has been followed by the Greek and Byzantine routes some of them starting from the Black Sea settlements and reaching the Baltic Sea. A well known Romanian historian and diplomat, Gheorghe Bratianu spoke about the Black Sea as being the pivotal area or the plank for the international trade.

The routes for the transit of energetic resources from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Caucasus to Europe along the Southern path are most of them crossing the Black Sea, for example from Baku to Tbilisi and Ceyhan or from the Caspian sea shores of Kazakhstan to the port of Novorossyisk. Large opportunities in economy and transportation are currently offered by the northern half of the Black Sea basin by navigable rivers such as the Danube, Dnieper and Don, while on the southern part, Turkey can ensure the connection to the Mediterranean ports. Interestingly enough, projects for European corridors are following some of the historic routes from West to East (Dresden-Prague-Vienna Budapest Sofia Istanbul) and from North to South (Helsinki Moscow Kiev Chisinau Bucharest Alexandropolis).

They also establish a continuum between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea areas joining the main commercial routes of Europe that existed since the agreements between Venetian cities and the Ottomans. This political and economic background allows us today to speak about the materialization of a new strategic concept, namely the development of an Extensive Southern Shore of NATO and European Union from Western Mediterranean to the Black Sea stretched out to other regions such as the Middle East, the Caspian and Central Asia space. Developments in these areas require a closer look on the ways to manage risks and threats to European security and to project peace and stability objectives beyond the former European limes.

Lets now go to the second point of my presentation and address in opposition to the first part about opportunities, what are the risks and challenges to European security that emerge from the Black Sea area.

2. Risks and threats to European security emerging from the Black Sea area Extrapolating historic lessons to the present international context, one could notice

that the greatest risks to the Byzantine Empire were defined by Constantin Porfirogenet ( in De Administrando Imperio) as coming from the northern shore of the Black Sea. Facing the Persian and Arab tribes threats, the Byzantines developed interesting strategies based on conjectural alliances with some Arab and Barbarian tribes to fight other barbarian tribes. This policy remained known in the history as the diplomacy of the steppe. With the only exception of the Cold War freezing period, the Black Sea area has always been a source of insecurity, invasions and migrations, and a gateway for importing region instabilities to the core of Europe.

Key elements in this context could be considered the interlinking evolutions of regional disparities, low intensity conflicts, illegal trafficking of armaments, mafia intrusion, human beings and drugs traffic, migrations and terrorist phenomena.

The creation of a large number of new states after the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Former Yugoslavia also brought to light a number of frozen territorial and ethnic disputes that are still not solved from Transdniestria to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo issues. Each of them has evolved along its own specificity; the international community involvement has also been differentiated on a case by case basis; but all of them stand for emerging risks to European security.

The large accumulations of military technique in the Black Sea area during the Cold War has increased the opportunities for illegal trafficking of armaments and munitions that also feed the needs of secessionist movements in building private armies and paramilitary forces. Maintenance of military assets and bases despite the international community efforts and the OSCE CFE provisions is also of factor of latent negative evolutions in these regions. In my opinion we are facing now a de-localization of domestic disputes and their gradual expansion, since illegal groupings have acquired the means to geographically extend their networking. One example that I am very familiar with is the fact that Transdniestrian armament has been sold to Tchetchen fighters and the illegal

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

14

trafficking with SALW from this region was directed to conflict areas both West, to the Balkans, and East, to the Middle East and Caucasus.

The creation of new independent states also brought to light the problems of transition to democracy and the inherent difficulties of strengthening statality and rule of law. Neighboring former Soviet states face nowadays direct risks related to the improvement of political legitimacy, reduction of corruption and fight against domestic or foreign mafias. In relation to this, tensions have arisen between regional integration and fragmentation, between domestic centers of power and their periphery incorporating sometime uncontrolled areas along the boundaries of the frozen conflicts. Democratization and opening of the markets could not advance in a proper way without coping with the need for a political answer to these tensions. It is clear that the importance of raw military power in the Black Sea is declining and that if one wants to find ways to solve the internal conflicts and to counter new threats, one must find other peacemaking instruments in order to secure the regional stability.

Against this background, the tension between integration and disintegration could also be linked to political traditions and inertial mentalities. The Cold War competition and armament race left traceable legacies on collective behaviors and it has confronted some of the limes states with a rather false political perception about the dichotomy between the strengthening of state central powers and the inherent fragility the democratization processes generate. This is why authoritarian models of governing are still an appealing subject to the political elite in some countries. This is also why regime changes are often a matter of domestic strife and instability. Moreover, the historic heritage of the Black Sea dividing lines steps forward from time to time, when competition on resources, energetic dependence, as well as relocation of military forces become a matter of divergent rhetoric.

The Black Sea region has also a significant migratory flow for several reasons including historical motives, demographic and economic growth disparities and maintenance of frozen conflicts. The area is a potential European gate for outside flows coming from Asia, but also the Maghreb Makrek regions or even Africa. To take the example of regional disparities, Russia and Turkey represent more than two-thirds of the Black Sea neighboring countries. The mature market economies such as Greece and Turkey stand for 40% of the Black Sea GDP. According to World Bank typology, the entire region has a GDP per inhabitant slightly over 3000 USD, at the limit between medium-high and medium-low, with Moldova and Georgia being the poorest countries.

Illegal migration coupled with the development of local mafias is a basis for potential increase in the arms trafficking and the transit of terrorist assets through the Black Sea to Europe. Although there are no terrorist organizations born in the Black Sea area, the proximity to Middle East, Balkans and Asia is a significant advantage for terrorists from these regions to connect their strongholds to transit zones and channels and launch attacks on European soil.

It is obvious that these security risks are interconnected and that conventional threats and frozen conflicts catalyze the emergence of asymmetric challenges. There is no single Achilles heel but a complex picture of hot spots, associated weaknesses and growing instabilities. A potential solution for regional problems cannot be based therefore but on an extended concept of security that might incorporate regional integration, democratization, economic growth and re-definition of strategic policies towards the Black Sea.

3. A strategic approach to the future of the Black Sea in the current security context How can we define a new security approach towards the Black Sea area? Can this

region overcome historic legacies and evolve along the lines of a new strategic paradigm? As I have mentioned at the very beginning, I believe that we live in a time of

tremendous opportunities that we should know how to grasp and make use of, a time of key transformations in our security paradigms.

We live in a time when overarching security frameworks complement the Westphalian international paradigm, when traditional geopolitical lines are blurred, if not completely disrupted, and when fragmented regions are gradually oriented towards new patterns of

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

15

cooperation and development. Two main security evolutions could be considered the basis for a new strategic dimension of the Black Sea area.

First, the enlargement of NATO and EU and their policies of peace and stabilization have introduced a comprehensive and exceptional project of modernization in the Black Sea region. When we look back into the history, we cannot find such a wide-spread approach with such a major potential for long-lasting security and sustainable development.

Second, the September 11 events taught us that traditional division into spheres of influence has been replaced by a more pervasive definition of the enemy that is faceless, borderless and pitiless. The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center could be considered as a transformation momentum with a long-standing impact on the complex relations between traditional nation-states and non-states actors that generates a redistribution of roles and rules on the international scene.

Security evolutions in the Black Sea area are deeply connected to these two developments: on one side, an increase of opportunities in the logic of integration, on the other an extended challenge for this region to cope with emerging security risks.

For the first time in its history the Black Sea is no longer instrumented as an asset in the classic competition between great powers and empires. This evolution is a direct consequence of political and strategic accumulations during the 90s: the accession to the Partnership for Peace of all riparian states; the conclusion by neighboring countries of different agreements for cooperation or accession to the European Union the creation of regional formats of economic or military cooperation, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or the Blackseafor; the development of confidence and security building measures in the Black Sea.

More recently, NATO enlargement including Romania and Bulgaria places the Black Sea riparian countries in a position of numeric parity (3 to 3) in relation to Euro-Atlantic membership. Georgia and Ukraine have also defined their national plans for integration into the Alliance. The European Union has defined target goals and plans for the future accession of Romania and Bulgaria and agreed on the candidature of Turkey. NATO and EU cooperation with Russia has evolved on pragmatic bases with a focus on joint measures to counter new security risks to international security. There is a now a real possibility of changing the frozen conflicts through multilateralization in areas such as Abkhazia, Transdniester or Nagorno Karabach with the support of different international organizations.

However, it seems to me that against this shinny picture, there is a tendency to avoid or postpone a clear and comprehensive European strategy towards this region. One reason is related to both NATO and EU approach on a state-by-state basis and the fact that there is little regional-oriented long-term thinking. Another one might be derived from a certain reluctance in defining a comprehensive framework of inter-institutional cooperation in this area. More specifically there are some missing links between regional formats, international efforts, political approaches, economic and military strategies. Currently, the representation most multinational institutions and decision-makers have of the Black Sea, is rather an unsolved puzzle, divided by punctual economic or military policies, than a clear image.

Since the security risks are inter-connected, so should be our broader strategic thinking in advancing stability and prosperity. We cannot speak about democracy without a stable society pattern and a sustainable economic development, we cannot think about military strategies towards distant lands and regions without focusing on our own backyard. And the European backyard has gradually moved from the Western Balkans to the Black Sea area.

In this context, the Black Sea could be the litmus test for the spread of democracy and security beyond Europe, in short for the new European security order. There are three strategic topics in which this process encounters its first significant challenges and opportunities in the Black Sea area since the end of the Cold War:

1. The first is related to the spread of institutional liberalism in the region and the successful transition towards democracy of riparian countries. This evolution will form the basis for predictable security partnerships and extension of markets from the Western shore

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

16

to Caucasus and Central Asia. It will also make the questions on where are the boundaries of Europe obsolete. An extended version of the Black Sea area could connect existing efforts for reconstruction, democratization and stability from the Balkans to Moldova, Caucasus and even farther to Afghanistan.

2. The second should be defined as a change in the military significance of the Black Sea. Here the region could play a double role: as a platform for power projection to the Middle East and Asia and as a buffer zone against asymmetric risks to European security. The announced relocation of US bases and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and, to a limited extend, in Iraq are only the beginning of a larger security process that could incorporate a deeper evaluation of existing opportunities for addressing the risks and threats emerging from this region. Surveillance of the sea and airspace, attention paid to scenarios for possible missile attacks against European states merge with the need for the development of regional instruments and infrastructure for force deployment and sustaining in distant theaters of operations. The new military technology has lessened the importance of ancient maritime routes, but it has correspondingly increased the requirement for new types of warfare networks and assets for which the Black Sea area acquired a similar if not higher importance.

3. The third challenge is based on the need for developing and securing the energetic routes from the Caspian and Central Asian fields to European markets. European projects on the new Great Silk Road intend to concentrate along new corridors (Traceca) oil and gas pipelines, communication networks and international financial flows. With the connections available on the Western shore in terms of railways, river systems and the emerging links to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea could become a significant source of prosperity and market development for both Europe and its riparian countries.

To conclude, in redefining the Black Sea security dimension I will replace the bridge versus frontier thinking with a new and, I believe, more comprehensive description: the Black Sea could become a strategic platform for the spread of democracy and stability, an emergent center for sustainable development and a networking piece in an extended security approach from the Mediterranean to Levant, Middle East and Central Asia.

The International Peace Academy, Columbia University, 2003

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

17

THE BLACK SEA REGION: NEW ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND OLD GEOPOLITICS

Nicholas DIMA

Rezumat: Lucrarea Bazinul Mrii Negre: Cooperare Economic Nou i Geopolitica Depit a fost pregtit la sugestia conducerii departamentului de Securitate Naional i Luare de Decizii (NSDM) din cadrul colii Navale Superioare Americane (U.S.Naval War College) din Newport, statul Rhode Island, unde autorul a fost profesor vizitator. Lucrarea scoate n eviden importana strategic a Mrii Negre la grania dintre Europa i Orientul Mijlociu i potenialul ei economic regional i internaional. Studiul subliniaz c n 1992 dup prbuirea Uniunii Sovietice rile din zona Mrii Negre au semnat o declaraie prin care s-au pus bazele Blocului de Cooperare Economic al bazinului Mrii Negre. Noua organizaie (BSEC) a fost confruntat ns de la nceput cu probleme economice i cu ambiii geopolitice. Urmrind s-i extind influena n regiune, Turcia de exemplu, a insistat asupra deschiderii i cooperrii economice. Rusia a urmrit s perpetueze ns dominarea politic i militar a mrii. Urmrind integrarea n NATO, Romnia i Bulgaria au promovat politici de apropiere de Aliana Nord Atlantic. Neputndu-se rupe total de Moscova, Ucraina i Georgia s-au concentrat asupra consolidrii independenei recent dobndite. Aliana NATO, a optat pentru o politic a uilor deschise. Diferenele sociale i culturale dintre rile membre ale Blocului de Cooperare al bazinului Mrii Negre, precum i agendele politice i geopolitice divergenele rilor membre, au fcut ca noua asociaie s avanseze lent i s obin rezultate modeste. Cu toate acestea, nsi apariia organizaiei imediat dup prbuirea comunismului reprezint un pas important pe calea integrrii Europene i Euro-Atlantice.

Summary (The Black Sea is strategically located between southeast Europe and Asia

Minor and it connects its littoral countries with the Mediterranean Sea and the world beyond. The Black Sea is extremely important economically and geo-politically to all the countries surrounding it and especially to Russia, which used to be the dominant power of the region. In 1992, after the collapse of communism and the break up of the former Soviet Union, at Turkeys initiative, the countries of this region signed a declaration that set up the Black Sea Economic Cooperation bloc (BSEC). The new organization was confronted, however, with problems of cultural diversity, economic stagnation, and opposing geo-political agendas. Turkey, for example, wanted to expand its influence in the area and pushed for increased economic cooperation. Russia, wanted to perpetuate its old political and military domination. Romania and Bulgaria pursued a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine and Georgia wanted to assert their newly found independence from Moscow. The European Union and NATO adopted open door policies with the intention of expanding themselves into the region. This paper analyses these factors and weighs the achievements and perspectives of the Black Sea area).

Introduction For most of its modern history, the Black Sea was of limited importance to

the Western world, but over the last decade it has received unusual economic, political, and strategic attention. The demise of communism and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union; the expansion of NATO and the European Union toward

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

18

the east; the discovery of huge new oil and gas reserves around the Caspian Sea; and strangely enough, the recent hypothesis that the Black Sea could be the location of Noahs flood, have triggered an international attention unknown for this region in recent history. (1) Is this just a temporary phenomenon or the emergence of a new and important region of the world?

The fall of communism and the birth of the newly independent countries around the Black Sea offer unique political and economic opportunities to integrate this area in the modern, Western-led world. However, three important questions remain. Will Russia, the main successor state of the former Soviet Union, accept a loss of status and cooperate as an equal partner with the other countries? If so, given the mosaic of cultures and interests that makes up the region, will the Black Sea countries prove capable of full cooperation? Last but not least, what is the position of the United States and of the West toward this region? Whatever the answers, the Black Sea countries appear to be on the road to creating a new area of cooperation.

Brief Geographic and Historical Background The Black Sea is located in southeast Europe, where it separates the old

continent from, or connects it with Asia Minor. The sea is in a way an extension of the Mediterranean Sea, with which it is linked through the small Sea of Marmara and the narrow Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. By comparison to the Mediterranean Sea, which has a surface area of almost a million square miles, the Black Sea is only 168,500 square miles in size, but it is larger than the better-known Baltic Sea or Red Sea. In addition, the Black Sea is rather deep, reaching over 3,600 feet. Its waters, however, are heavily polluted and have a toxic composition that makes life impossible at depths deeper than about six hundred feet. (2)

Named Pontus Euxinus by the Romans, the Black Sea has been of major importance to the inhabitants of the area since ancient times. It was sailed in antiquity by Greek sailors and traders who apparently founded its first city ports. Most Black Sea ports of today have their roots in those days, and ancient Greek and Roman ruins are still visible around them. The Romans controlled the western and southern shores of the sea and used them for commerce. One of the ancient silk roads connecting the West and the East also passed through the Black Sea area. The Byzantine Empire continued the Roman control of the sea until it fell into Ottoman hands. For a while, the Black Sea became a Turkish lake, and its navigation and trade served mainly Turkish interests. The ascent of Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries coincided with the gradual retreat of the Ottoman Empire and brought a new balance of power in the region. The eventual collapse of the Ottomans marked a radical change in the geopolitics of the Black Sea basin. New international agreements opened the navigation through the straits and through the Danube, helping reconnect the countries of the region with the Mediterranean Sea.

The establishment of the USSR after World War I modified further the geopolitical balance in the region; Moscows expansion in the Balkans after World War II transforming the Black Sea into a Soviet stronghold. The Soviets built new military facilities and a strong Black Sea fleet poised against Turkey and NATO. Instead of serving as a bridge between East and West and between North and South, for decades the Black Sea became a sea of separation. The end of communism marked yet another era in the life of this sea. However, in which direction did the surrounding countries begin to move at the turn of the millennium?

The end of the twentieth century witnessed a number of new trends little anticipated during previous years. The totalitarian regimes and their centralized

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

19

economies fell apart. A new form of international competition and cooperation gave birth gradually to a global economic concept. Multi-ethnic countries broke up and were replaced by new regional groupings of states. The most important feature of this part of the world at the end of the century was the emergence of many newly independent states. At the same time, the European Union and NATO began to expand toward the east and in the process became magnets for the Black Sea countries. After centuries of neglect and decades of communist abuse, the new countries of the area saw a chance of cooperation among themselves and with the West both as a goal by itself and as a way to gain access to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Turkey, a full member of NATO and an aspiring member of the European Union, was the first to act.

The Black Sea Initiative Ankara was behind the initiative of Black Sea cooperation, which dates back

to 1990. Turkey saw a chance to spearhead a new age of regional development, and probably to regain some of the influence it had had in previous centuries. The other littoral countries, seeing it in their own interests to cooperate, acceded to the Turkish initiative. They also perceived it as a way of distancing themselves from Moscows tutelage. For most of the former communist countries, the beginning of the 1990s was a period of euphoria, of rediscovering identities, a period of dreams of a better future. Russia, which from a geopolitical point of view lost the most in the new transformation of the region, joined the project reluctantly and probably only because it could not afford to be left out. While Moscow maintained a front of seeming cooperation, nationalist Russian circles resorted to violence to retain control over the former Soviet republics of the Black Sea basin.

From an economic point of view, the Black Sea is of great importance to Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, countries that otherwise would be landlocked. The sea is economically important to Russia too, because with its vast size it needs as many sea links with the world as possible. In addition, unlike the other seaports of Russia, its Black Sea ports are open to navigation almost year round. For Moscow, moreover, the Black Sea is the sole direct link to the Balkans and to the Mediterranean Sea, and therefore it is of utmost geopolitical importance.

From a cultural and political standpoint, the countries of the Black Sea region do not share much in common except the sea itself. Most of them have a deep fear of Russia and have uneasy relations with each other. They also belong to different cultures and ethnic groups, speak different languages, and have different histories, interests, and aspirations. With the exception of the Turks, who are Moslems, most the inhabitants of the shores of the sea are Orthodox Christians, but even they do not always get along.

The Ukrainians, for example, have been controlled and abused for centuries by the Russians and are now trying hard to assert their newly acquired independence. Aware of their precarious internal situation and of their geopolitical position between Russia and Europe, the Ukrainians have chosen to first consolidate their statehood rather than to seek integration with the West. The Romanians, farther south, are traditionally Western-oriented and want to join NATO and the European Union. Romania, however, like practically every former communist country of the region, is controlled by politicians who put their own interests before those of the country. Thus, reforms have been delayed for personal gain and the country has made little progress during the last decade to justify Western integration. To complicate the situation, the very existence of Moldova is questionable, and between Romania and Ukraine territorial issues are pending. Bulgaria, located between Romania and Turkey, does not seem to have such

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

20

problems, but the status of its Turkish minority and the possibility of a breakup of Macedonia and are causes of great concern. The Georgians, on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, like the Russians and most Ukrainians, Romanians, and Bulgarians, are also Christian Orthodox. Georgia, however, has endured harsh Russian treatment since it declared its independence. Strategically located near Turkey, Georgia fell victim to a Russian - incited separatist movement, and to a large degree it has remained under Moscows control.

As for Turkey, which launched the Black Sea cooperation project, its goals are chiefly economic, but with political underpinnings. Should the European Union expand further and integrate Romania and Bulgaria, it will be difficult to leave Turkey out, since they are all equally involved in this new cooperation project.

Moscow and the New Black Sea Trend On 25 June 1992, the heads of states and governments of Albania, Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine met in Istanbul and signed the Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Greece are not Black Sea-littoral countries, but they are interested in the cooperation, as are a few other countries that expressed their intention to join.

The founding statement stresses constructive relations based on the principles and documents of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Its objective was defined from the start as creating conditions for a mutually beneficial prosperity. The statement recognizes the need for economic cooperation based on free market economies and upholds the value of good neighborliness, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. The document acknowledges that the region is faced with serious conflicts and dangers, but the signers bind themselves to strive in good faith to oppose violence, aggression, lawlessness, terrorism, and to promote peaceful settlements. In the final sentences, the signatories declare their intent to transform the Black Sea into a region of peace, freedom, and stability that should facilitate the processes and structures of European integration. (3)

The declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation was meant to mark the beginning of a new era. It was to be, however, a very difficult era. The document was too broad and optimistic for a region that was just rediscovering freedom and did not have the economic means to attain its new goals. Turkey was just experimenting with democracy and a market economy; the formerly communist countries were in political turmoil and economic disarray. Most of the inhabitants of those countries were enthusiastic about democracy and had great expectations, but their immediate futures were bleak. Their leaders, former communists, were in no mood to give up power to change the systems in ways that would jeopardize their interests. For the population at large, the results were disappointing. Moscow and the Russians in general were particularly frustrated.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Moscow had plenty to worry about in the Black Sea Basin. Relations with Ukraine were very tense. Moldova was moving toward rejoining Romania, while Romania itself wanted to integrate with the West. The situation in the Caucasus was grave, and Georgia was improving its relations with Turkey. Russia was losing its preeminent position in the Black Sea, and Turkey was the ascendant. While Ankara was launching a new regional policy, Moscow was under attack inside and challenged from outside. The new Kremlin leaders had to redefine Russias policy and to update its military doctrine. During those tense years, nationalist Russian leaders agitated openly against the newly independent states, and many of the Russians living in these states took arms and rose against the new local authorities. In the southwestern part of the former union the ensuing events crippled the very countries that could have made the Black Sea cooperation work.

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

21

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

22

From Cooperation to Conflict At the end of World War II Moscow demanded a foothold in Constantinople

and the Turkish Straits, but Western allies rejected the demand. Fifty years later, Moscow was in no position to demand anything, but neither would it accept the prospect of being reduced to just another country of the region. Simply put, Moscow could not accept the idea of losing an empire and the status of superpower, let alone relinquishing control over Ukraine and the Black Sea.

After almost 350 years under Russian control, Ukraine was in a precarious position in 1991 when it declared independence. The easternmost region of the country was highly industrialized and heavily russified. Crimea, a gift received symbolically from Khrushchev in 1954, had a multi-ethnic population. The western part of the country, another recent addition, was largely Catholic and Western oriented. Thus, from the very beginning, Ukraine was bound to collide with Russia. The first Russo-Ukrainian dispute was caused by the status of the former Soviet fleet headquartered in Sevastopol. The dispute was aggravated by the claim of Crimea Russians to secession and by the pro-Russian attitude of the industrialized Don Basin. After a few years of quarreling Russia agreed to split the ships of its Black Sea fleet with Ukraine and to recognize Ukraines sovereignty. But Moscow would not give up on other regional issues. (4)

If Moscows disputes with Ukraine were settled peacefully, others were settled only by instigations to rebellion, war, and military interventions. Such wars occurred in the early 1990s in the newly proclaimed independent republics of the Black Sea basin from Moldova to Georgia, and from Northern Caucasus to Trans-Caucasus. Georgia, an area of great Russian interest, paid the highest price. Instigated by Moscow, the small Abkhazian minority declared separate independence and engaged in a brutal civil war against the Georgian authorities. This formerly autonomous region, situated on the Black Sea coast next to Russia, secured its independence to the surprise of everyone. At the start of the war the Abkhazian minority had made up only 18 percent of the population of this autonomous region, while Georgians made up the majority. By the end of the war, practically the entire Georgian population of about 250,000 had been forced to move to Georgia proper. At the same time, the Ossetian autonomous region of northern Georgia, helped by the Russians, waged its own successful war and virtually split from Georgia. To worsen the situation, the Russians also induced the Ajar autonomous region, bordering the Black Sea and Turkey, to rid itself of Georgian rule. Moreover, a predominantly Armenian region where a Russian military base was located, broke with Tbilisi and asked the Russian troops to stay. Powerless against the combined secessionist and Russian forces and wrecked by internal divisions, Georgia lost the wars and with them effective control over half of its Black Sea frontage. The war humiliated the government in Tbilisi and forced it to sign a treaty that allowed Russia to maintain military bases on Georgian territory. (5)

The Chechen wars represented another Russian geopolitical reaction to the challenges of the post-Soviet trends in the region. Although Chechnya is a small autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, its successful separation could have grave consequences for Moscow. The avowed goal of the first leader of Chechnya, former Soviet general Djokar Dudayev, was to unite in an independent country all the autonomous republics of northern Caucasus, from Abkhazia at the Black Sea to Dagestan at the Caspian Sea. Moscow could not accept such an outcome, and the wars that it waged against the Chechens were brutal in the

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

23

extreme. This reaction to Chechen separatism also explains why Moscow vigorously helped Abkhazia and South Ossetia against Georgia and sided with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. (6)

The predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh represents yet another Russian geopolitical response. The enclave is located near the Armenian border but inside Azerbaijan. Once the Soviet Union dissolved the Armenian leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian government in Yerevan decided to split the province from Azerbaijan and unite it with Armenia. Out of fear of Turkey, Armenia had remained loyal to Moscow after the breakup of the USSR and enjoyed Russias support against Azerbaijan. The victory, however, was pyrrhic, because Armenia found itself outside the mainstream of the new political trends of the region. Nevertheless, the results pleased Moscow, where the foreign minister declared openly in 1993 that the Caucasian region represented a zone of vital interest for Russia. And he warned against the danger of losing geo-political positions that took centuries to conquer. (7)

Another Black Sea conflict triggered by Moscow and local Russians was in the Trans-Dnestr. This region, a rather small area of the newly independent republic of Moldova, is located on the left bank of the Dnestr River. Moldova, however, is basically the former Romanian province of Bessarabia, and pursuing its hidden geopolitical agenda, Moscow did everything to block its possible reunification with Romania. By Russian accounts, Russia spent huge resources to make sure that Moldova remained under its control. In case the new Moldavian leaders still contemplated reunification with Romania, the Russian population of Tiraspol, with the help of nationalist circles in Moscow, created the Moldavian Trans-Dnestr Republic. In 1992, to secure its existence, it triggered a war against the government in Chisinau, a war that claimed about a thousand lives and produced 100,000 refugees. Whenever the Moldavian forces prevailed during the armed conflict, the Russian units of the Fourteenth Army in Tiraspol would intervene. The commander of this army, Gen. Alexandr Lebed, declared on several occasions that the Dnestr region was the key to the Balkans and that it was a strategic crossroad between Ukraine, Romania, and the Black Sea. If Russia loses this area, he stressed bluntly, it will lose influence in the entire region. Moscow also insisted that any action in the Danube Basin and the Black Sea required its prior agreement, because these areas were of traditional Russian interests. Moscows continuous support for the rebellious Dnestr republic is of concern to Romania and Ukraine, which fear that it betrays hidden Russian intentions in the region. (8)

From Conflict to Accommodation The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 caught Moscow and ethnic

Russians generally by surprise. Neither the Soviet leadership nor the Russian populate were ready for such radical changes. During the Soviet years, the Marxist leaders had taken advantage of the Russian majority to control the countrys political system, and the Russians had taken advantage of the system to keep the other nationalities under their rule. The demise of communism and the dissolution of the union left the two complementary camps in confusion. In the new climate, many Russians of the non-Russian republics took matter in their own hands.

Meanwhile, Moscow prepared a new political and military doctrine. In 1992 Moscow announced the doctrine of near abroad, proclaiming Russias exclusive interests in the former Soviet republics. At the same time, Moscow demanded the right to keep military units on the territories of these republics and on their borders.

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

24

It appears that in the Black Sea region, Russia was especially preoccupied with Turkey, which Moscow saw as aspiring to treat the sea as its own preserve. During the decade of the 1990s Turkey, indeed, maintained the strongest military navy in the Black Sea, but avoided displays of its forces and challenges to Russia. According to a Russian newspaper, for example, in the mid-1990s Russia had fifty-two warships and four submarines in the Black Sea, while Turkey had 116 surface ships and craft and sixteen submarines. (9) By this time, however, Moscow had managed to reestablish control over most of the former Soviet republics. If Moscows military control was indirect or veiled, its economic and political control was open.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union prompted Moscow to create the Community of Independent States (CIS), aimed at restoring its political and economic control over the former USSR. Most of the former republics joined the economic side of CIS but refused to join its military and security arrangements. This suspicious Russian-led reintegration caused resentment among members and continuous bickering. Discouraged by such disagreements and aiming to strengthen their own statehood, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and later Uzbekistan set up a new cooperation bloc called GUUAM (initials of the names of the member countries). Russia, however, perceived this group as an attempt to undercut its dominance of the CIS, and it countered by increasing its cooperation with Armenia, Greece, and Iran. At the same time, Moscow continued to help Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Trans-Dnestr Republic, which for all practical purposes were independent entities. The very existence of these quasi-states reminded Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine of their tenuous situations should they further challenge Moscows domination. Indeed, an American analyst has noted that post-Soviet Russia was not likely to play a constructive role in international affairs, but that it was strong enough to endanger its newly independent neighbors and this is exactly what Russia did. (10)

Despite these conflicts, the Black Sea initiative took off and the dialogue between its members continued, which was in itself an achievement. By the mid-1990s, having secured again its control from Moldova to Georgia, Moscow itself was open for this dialogue. Yet, Russias position was far from clear. (11)

At the beginning of the new millennium Moscow is confronted indeed with a difficult geopolitical dilemma and a crisis of identity. The Russians have a strong cultural and historical identity, but a poor geographical one. The Russians know who they are, but do not appear to know the extent of their country. Does Russia extend to cover the Caucasus region? Should Russia hold on to Chechnya at any price? And what if other regions decide to secede from the Russian Federation?

If Moscow decides to fully adopt Western standards of democracy, Russia could indeed be confronted with territorial issues. By reforming itself, Russia could lose control over some parts of its land. By rejecting drastic reforms, Moscow could save its empire for a while longer, but its people will have no hope to achieve freedom or prosperity. Russias recent attitude toward the Black Sea Basin illustrates how difficult it is to make a choice.

The Black Sea Initiative and the West Since its official foundation in 1992, when it elaborated the Bosphorus

Statement, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) has evolved into a well-structured international organization, with a permanent secretariat in Turkey, a regional bank in Greece, and the seed of a Black Sea university in Romania. The permanent secretariat (PERMIS) is located in Istanbul and it coordinates twelve

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

25

working groups with specific agendas. The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) were established at Thessaloniki in June 1999 as the financial pillar of the organization. A parliamentary assembly (PABSEC) was chartered in 1998 and ratified by the member countries by May 1999. In addition, the organization acquired official observer status at the United Nations. The highest decision-making body is an assembly of foreign ministers who meet frequently; ultimate power, however, rests with the national governments. The chairmanship is rotated, and meetings of the heads of states and governments of the member countries are held periodically. (12)

So far, summits have been held in Istanbul in 1992, in Bucharest in 1995, in Moscow in 1996, in Yalta in 1998, and again in Istanbul in 1999. Each summit resulted in joint declarations and new decisions to increase cooperation. In addition to summits, numerous meetings have been organized at every level, from ministerial conferences to working groups and to small topical conferences. For example, in April 2001 a foreign ministerial meeting in Moscow called for BSEC to be a more consolidated, effective, partnership. The BSEC Website announces so many meetings that one gains the impression that this is either a very active organization or its main purpose is to debate its structures and agendas. (13) The fact is that few of the major goals set by the organization have been tangibly achieved. The most pressing are of environmental, economic, and political.

Water pollution in the Black Sea is especially severe off its northern coast, caused chiefly by industries operating along the Danube, Dnestr, Dnepr, and Don Rivers. During the decades of forced industrialization in the former communist countries of the area, the pollution increased alarmingly. As a consequence, over the last several years fishery yields have diminished dramatically, and some marine species have been threatened with extinction. Alarmed by the situation, in 1993 the riparian countries established a special environmental program (BSEP) aimed at saving the Black Sea. The project was endorsed by the member countries in 1996 and got under way in 1997, with initial American funding. A parallel program was set up to save the Danube and the Danube Delta. NATO and other international organizations also got involved in Black Sea ecological programs. (14) The main polluters, however, particularly Russia and the Ukraine, showed little interest in addressing this major problem and in reducing the pollution on their rivers. Nevertheless, the environmental field is one in which the BSEC negotiations have produced real programs and achieved practical results.

From the point of view of economic cooperation, which is the chief goal of the organization, results have been more modest. Nevertheless, important issues have been raised. Among them are the need for a better infrastructure around the Black Sea, integrated with the wider European network; the need to develop a common energy market and better financial systems; and the need to expand trade and to improve communication. While some results have been obtained, most of the good intentions of the organization have yet to be achieved. For example, the Turkish proposal to transform the BSEC into a free trade zone has met with resistance from member countries with different goals. Also, since 1999, when the European Union officially invited Romania and Bulgaria to start negotiations for future membership, the two countries have shifted their main focus and interest toward the EU.

One delicate economic issue that confronts the Black Sea countries is routing the pipelines that in the future will deliver Caspian petroleum to Western

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

26

markets. Having the pipes cross ones territory means a measure of control and important fees from the flow of oil. Russia, which borders the Caspian Sea and energy-rich Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, insists that the pipelines should cross its territory. Romania and Bulgaria are competing with each other to bring the pipelines through their respective territories. Turkey insists on a new pipeline (BTS route) that would cross Azerbaijan, Georgia and Anatolia and would bring Kazakh and Caspian Sea oil from Baku to Tbilisi and then to Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. When completed, supposedly by 2005, this pipeline would pump roughly one million barrels of oil per day. The United States strongly favors this project, while Russia opposes it. Russia has already completed the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (PCP), which in August 2001 began to pump oil from northern Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. An additional pipeline has also been built by Russia from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, bypassing the troubled territory of Chechnya. Western experts call attention to the fact that continuous dependence on Russian pipelines would allow Moscow to raise tariffs, constrain exports, and extract economic and political concessions from its weaker neighbors. No final agreement has been reached with regard to the BTC line, but the odds are in its favor. (15)

There have been some practical results of the Black Sea cooperation initiative, but it is difficult to discern whether they are the fruits of the new accords that the organization has facilitated or of bilateral agreements. Among them is the construction of a highway around the Black Sea that apparently already started; the laying of underwater fiber-optic cables between Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania; and a number of cultural and tourist agreements. Romania and Bulgaria are also building a new bridge over the Danube with Western financial assistance, and Romania and Turkey began to operate a ferryboat across the Black Sea. People also travel more freely throughout the region than previously, goods from one country are more readily available in the other countries, and in general there is a new climate of goodwill. Recent BSEC Website pages are even more optimistic and cite a number of accomplishments. Thus, the site asserts the determination of the member countries to seek common economic goals, to transform an area of malaise into one of confidence, to achieve open and permanent dialogue, to adopt a common approach to fight organized crime and illicit traffic in narcotics, to bring the member countries closer to European economic and political standards, to act as a bridge between Europe and the Caucasus, and to stimulate a new international interest in the region. (16)

The most difficult problems of cooperation in BSEC, however, have been political and security in nature and no real economic cooperation is possible without first safeguarding regional peace and stability. For the first several years of the organization, Moscow avoided any substantial discussion on permanent solutions to the new geopolitical complications that it had created around the Black Sea, and not much could be achieved without Russias cooperation. Moscow began to engage in more serious negotiations only after regaining control in the region, especially after the 1996 summit, when it acquired the chairmanship of the organization. Yet, one can hardly say that engaging Russia in negotiations has brought tangible results. For example, Moscow proposed the enlargement of BSEC to bring in such new members as Yugoslavia and Iran, which would bolster its position. Romania opposed the proposal on the ground that such enlargement would make consensus even more difficult. It is obvious that Moscows geopolitical

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

27

actions and reactions in the Black Sea Basin have made impossible any hard security agreement that it does not want.

There are, nevertheless, a number of issues such as controlling international smuggling, intercepting the traffic of weapons and drugs, and combating terrorism, for which results are attainable, but the BSEC countries do not have the necessary financial means. By comparison with the West, the former communist countries of the Black Sea Basin are extremely poor and their economies are in disarray. Average salaries are less than a hundred U.S. dollars per month, unemployment is high, and life expectancy is declining. In Russia, for instance, life expectancy has reached a low of fifty-nine years, lower than in India. (17) During the last decade the governments of these countries have borrowed heavily from the West just to survive, and in many regions populations have been left to muddle through on their own. Consequently, corruption at the highest levels is widespread and alcoholism and criminality are commonplace. By comparison, Greece and Turkey are in relatively good shape, but their economic resources are limited. If BSEC has been a good initiative in terms of promoting a new spirit from within, now the organization needs a boost from the outside to make an impact. If the European Union and NATO want to extend the area of stability and security to the east, they need to do more than make pledges of moral support. Clearly, investing in this part of the world today is to buy security for tomorrow.

During the last decade, Western Europe and the United States have been active in southeast Europe but have not been determined or focused enough to make a strong impact. The most important Western initiatives of the 1990s for the development of the region have been the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and the Stability Pact. SECI, launched in 1996 with American support, aimed chiefly at improving cooperation among the countries of the region and at attracting foreign investments. The Stability Pact was launched in 1999 in Sarajevo to avoid future conflicts, promote democracy, increase security, and foster reconstruction. (18) So far, neither of them has produced the results anticipated by the impoverished people of the region, but they have brought new hope for cooperation. Nevertheless, after decades of what they perceive as abandonment by the West, the people of the region expect a great deal more from the European Union and from the United States.

The Black Sea Initiative, NATO, and the United States Over the last several years three visions of the future of the organization

have evolved within the Black Sea countries. First, understanding their need for security and acknowledging current trends of economic globalization, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria have adopted an openly pro-Western policy. They have promoted cooperation of equal partners in the region and have envisioned full integration with NATO and the EU. In addition, Turkey hopes to prove itself a stable pivot in this part of the world and a useful link between Europe and the newly independent countries of Central Asia.

Moscow, however, has its own separate vision, although it has not spelled it out openly. Russia is searching for a twenty-first century identity, but in the meantime it continues to promote nineteenth century geopolitics. Consequently, Moscow has not opposed BSEC per se, but has taken pains to perpetuate its control and prevent any other nation for getting the upper hand in the Black Sea area.

Between these two poles is a third vision. Realizing that their current chances of integrating into the Euro-Atlantic structures are slim, the Black Sea

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

28

GUUAM countries have tried to act as a new bridge between Europe and Russia by asserting as much independence as possible. If Russia opts to remain outside Europe, these countries could become a buffer zone separating the West from the new Russia. In a way, these countries might play the role the former East European countries played during the cold war. At the same time, the European Union has initiated a process of enlargement, stressing that it is open to any aspiring candidate able to make the changes necessary to qualify for membership. Undoubtedly, the prospect of integrating into the West and the hope of enjoying its prosperity have prevented conflicts and have made Eastern European countries more tolerant, less belligerent, and more open to cooperation. (19)

During the post communist transition, the United States has assumed a major role in the Balkans. The most visible American involvement in the Black Sea Basin during the 1990s was through NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) and through bilateral or multinational military exercises. The level of cooperation with the United States and the U.S. Navy has differed from country to country, but every Black Sea country has adhered to the PfP programs. Russia joined the PfP in1994, but after NATOs 1999 Kosovo campaign it reduced its participation. Moreover, Russia perceives the U.S. initiatives in the Black Sea as undermining its own position and feels that it is being singled out once again as the enemy. Accordingly, as of 2000 Moscow revised its military doctrine, emphasizing anew the threats of US world hegemony and of NATO expansion. Furthermore, Moscow abhors the idea of being treated as just another Black Sea country and has rejected vehemently any intention of integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Nonetheless, Washington has managed to engage Russia in various international activities, from combating organized crime to fighting terrorism. (20)

Since the collapse of communism, Turkey, an important ally of the United States in this region, has been through a difficult transition. Ankara has been confronted domestically with economic difficulties, Kurdish separatism, and outbursts of militant Islamism. Nevertheless, during the last decade Turkey has cultivated excellent relations with Romania and Georgia, has supported Ukraines independence while keeping good relations with Russia, and has backed vigorously the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO. Turkey, however, has not welcomed the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Black Sea, claiming that it could trigger a negative Russian reaction. Nevertheless, the United States has stressed that it wants Turkey to remain strong and stable, to develop along democratic and secular lines, and to maintain strong security ties with the West. (21) Furthermore, in June 2001 President Bush proposed that every new democracy from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea be admitted to NATO, and among the BSEC countries Romania and Bulgaria were given positive consideration. Such an enlargement would help pacify the Balkans, stabilize the southeast reaches of Europe, and consolidate Americas position near the Middle East. (22)

Romania has been the most pro-Western Black Sea country and was the first to adhere to the PfP, as early as January 1994. In fact, after its December 1989 revolution Romania entered a period of excellent relations with the United States and offered NATO the use of the port of Constana, the largest on the Black Sea. Throughout the entire decade of the 1990s, enthusiasm for America, Western Europe, and early accession to NATO remained high in Romania, but much -needed economic reforms lagged badly behind expectations. Nevertheless, Romania was officially accepted as a future candidate to the European Union, and

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

29

the government began to focus on the goal of joining the EU. With regard to its Black Sea capabilities, American analysts consider Romanias navy small but serviceable. The Romanian navy, on its part, has welcomed all cooperation with the U.S. Navy, seeing the American presence in the Black Sea as a major stabilizing factor. Romania also considers itself an important strategic partner for the West in this part of Europe. In this regard, it borders a long stretch of the Danube and has a recently built canal that bypasses the Danube Delta and connects Constana with Rotterdam through the new Danube-Rhine canal. Constana and Rotterdam are sister cities and Netherlands has decided to help modernize the Romanian port to better serve the hinterland of Europe. (23)

Bulgarias position on the Black Sea and its degree of cooperation with the West is largely similar to those of Romania. The only difference is that traditionally Bulgaria was pro-Russian and anti-Turkish, and in the past it was an obedient Russian ally. Since the fall of communism, Bulgaria has improved its relations with Turkey and has pursued a pro-Western attitude aimed at joining NATO and the European Union. Recently, Bulgaria helped arm the Macedonian army, an act that contributed to the stabilization of the Balkans.

Georgia for its part, has been much more cautious than Romania and Bulgaria over the last decade and only recently has expressed a desire to become a NATO member. Georgia is the weakest and the least stable of all the Black Sea countries. Its fleet is miniscule, even more poorly equipped than the rebel Abkhazian fleet which Russia created. Georgia, however, is Western oriented, and its relations with the United States are good; recently, the United States granted financial assistance to boost Georgias coast guard. Nevertheless, the country remains at the mercy of Russias geopolitical whim.

Between its traditional ties with Russia and its desire to move toward the West, Ukraine finds itself in a very difficult situation. Western analysts fear that Ukraines independence and territorial integrity are not yet assured. Almost one-fourth of Ukraines population is Russian, and this group as well as other citizens, may prefer strong ties with the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, as long as Kiev continues to maintain good relations with Moscow and avoids tilting toward NATO, Russia seems willing to respect the status quo. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has cooperated with the American-led PfP, but its navy is considered largely ineffective; in any case is manned by Russians. Ukraine has participated fully in BSEC programs, maintained considerate relations with its neighbors, and promoted good relations with the United States. Ukraines main problems are its ruined economy and the need to pursue a balancing act between Russia and the West. Other potential problems for Ukraine and Romania, aside for the murky future of Moldova and the Trans-Dnestr republic, are some territorial disputes. One of them is over the miniscule Serpent Island. This island was formerly part of Romania, but it was taken by the Soviet Union after World War II. The transfer was never confirmed by a legal agreement. In 1992 the island was inherited by Ukraine. The rocky island is not inhabited and is of little importance in itself at present, but its strategic location at the mouth of Danube and the prospect of finding oil on its platform is a cause of friction. In 1997 Romania and Ukraine signed a friendship treaty, but misgivings continue on both sides. (24)

The September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and the new evidence regarding terrorist activities in Western Europe and other regions of the world have convinced NATO of the importance of extending the area of stability

www.

geop

oliti

c.ro

30

and support into East Europe. In May 2002 Russia itself engaged into a joint council for closer cooperation with NATO. Seven formerly Eastern Bloc countries, however, have been identified to receive invitations to become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Among them are Romania and Bulgaria. Their inclusion would help stabilize the Balkans and would extend NATOs sphere over the Black Sea to Turkey. The two countries have already offered NATO access to some of their harbors and airports. In addition, ahead of becoming an official member of the organization, Romania has sent a special military unit to Afghanistan. This unit is operating now alongside the American troops against the Al Qaeda groups near the Pakistani border. (25)

Conclusions The Black Sea cooperation initiative is a promising project, with excellent

ideas and substantial goal but with limited resources and a modest record of achievement. Over the last decade, BSEC has managed to promote a continuous dialogue, avoid further conflict, and attract a great deal of international attention. However, the organization has encountered problems of diversity, poverty, varied aspirations, and meager foreign investment. Furthermore, the traditional Russian geopolitical aims have been on a collision course with the new Western geopolitical goals. While Moscows final intentions remain a puzzle, NATO and the European Union are striving to transform the Black Sea into an area of international peace and stability. Indeed, the Black Sea Basin could become a region of cooperation and a bridge toward Central Asia and the Middle East. However, to further such goals, the region will need substantial assistance and much more Western involvement.

To promote stability and economic development, NATO and the European Union will have to accelerate the integration of the region into its ranks. To secure peace in the Balkan Peninsula, for example, Slovenia to the west and Romania and Bulgaria to the east must be brought as soon as possible into NATO and the European Union. Concomitantly, NATO and EU should continue to